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European Union (EU) development policy appears to have gone through substantial change 
during recent years.1 In line with a wider reconsideration of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
during the late 1990s, the EU declared it was to follow the approach of other multilateral 
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actors and focus on poverty reduction as the main objective of its development policy.2 This 
was followed in 2005 with the European Consensus on Development, which sought to set out 
a common vision for the development policy of both the EU and the individual member 
states.3 The Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) concerns of poverty reduction, democracy 
and good governance, and developing country ownership were reaffirmed in this document. 
In this review, with reference to the five books under consideration, I outline some of the key 
issues that are pertinent when we consider how to understand these developments  
 
The edited book by Mold provides a critical overview of the increasingly complex 
interactions between the EU and developing countries. The diverse chapters in EU 
Development Policy in a Changing World: Challenges for the 21st Century focus in the main 
on the impacts of the enlargement of the EU on development policy. The book then goes on 
to analyse specific developments related to the various different regions that the EU engages 
with. Read as a whole this broadly critical book highlights how both internal and external 
pressures make it difficult for the EU to achieve the kind of effective and coherent approach 
outlined in the European Consensus of 2005. In his concluding chapter Mold suggests that 
perhaps the goal of coherence is an impossible dream. He suggests that ‘it is useless, for 
instance, to constantly exhort policy co-ordination and coherence in aid delivery if structural 
constraints and bureaucratic procedures do not allow this to take place’.4 
 
It is this goal of policy coherence that is addressed by Carbone’s edited collection. The 
Lisbon Treaty, which was recently ratified by the last outstanding member state, makes it 
clear that EU development policy will remain focused on poverty eradication, but that it 
should be conducted within the broader framework of the EU’s external relations.5 Hence, 
coherence in this context means the impact that other EU policy areas can potentially have on 
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international development. In Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy the authors look 
at the developmental impacts of a number of related policy areas. In particular, they focus on 
trade, agriculture, fisheries, security, migration, and the social dimensions of globalisation. 
The various chapters come to a similar conclusion about the limited impact that policy 
coherence for development has had on other policy areas. Instead, the EU’s economic and/or 
security interests continue to dominate. 
 
Flint’s contribution to the literature is to consider the coherence of the EU’s development 
policy in relation to concerns over environmental degradation. In Trade, Poverty and the 
Environment: The EU, Cotonou and the African-Caribbean-Pacific Bloc, he focuses his 
critique on the Cotonou Agreement and the EU’s attempts to promote sustainable 
development in its relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. 
He concludes that the continued dominance of neo-liberal thinking in EU policy to the ACP 
states results in neither a genuine focus on poverty alleviation nor a convincing case for 
sustainability. 
 
Faber and Orbie’s comprehensive edited collection also looks at recent developments in EU-
ACP relations. They direct their attention to the negotiation of Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), which result from the decision taken in the Cotonou Agreement to 
replace the preferential trade agreements that defined the relationship in the past, with 
reciprocal free trade agreements (FTAs) between the EU and six sub-regions of the ACP 
group. In Beyond Market Access for Economic Development: EU-Africa relations in 
transition, the contributors seek to interrogate the claim made by the EU that EPAs are in fact 
comprehensive development partnerships. They focus on Africa and the trade-related aspects 
of EPAs rather than the more familiar debates over market access. In particular attention is 
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paid to the new trade issues (services, investment, intellectual property rights, etc.), aid for 
trade measures, the impact on African regionalisation, and the wider foreign policy 
implications of EPAs. 
 
It is these implications for EU foreign policy that are the focus of Holden’s book. In Search 
of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument focuses on how 
development aid should be considered as part of the EU’s attempts to increase its structural 
power in international relations. Holden draws on the work of Susan Strange and understands 
structural power as the attempt to ‘mould the formal institutions and deeper material and 
ideational structures of the international system’.6 The book then focuses on an analysis of 
country case-studies from each of the main regions that the EU engages with, to assess how 
effective the EU has been in achieving structural change in these ‘partner’ countries. Holden 
concludes that in general the EU has been more effective in shaping change in the legal realm 
and in economic policy-making than in encouraging political change and democratisation.  In 
addition he also notes that there remains significant variation in the impact of EU structural 
power across the various regions. 
 
In this review of these five recent publications, that as a whole add significantly to the 
literature on EU development policy, I focus on four main themes. First, the historical 
legacies, from colonialism to the enlargement of the EU, that have shaped the approach 
witnessed today. Second, the global context, whether it be links between the security agenda 
and development thinking, or the ongoing difficulties in reaching agreement in the Doha 
Development Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Third, a discussion of the 
increasing uniformity in approach adopted by the EU to different regions of the world, based 
on the three pillars of aid, free trade, and political dialogue. Fourth, the extent to which EU 
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self-interest is driving policy and how this may be linked to moves towards realising an 
effective Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at the European level. 
 
Historical Legacies 
 
Contemporary relations between the EU and the developing world continue to be shaped by 
three inter-related historical circumstances: European colonialism, the Cold War, and the 
creation and various waves of enlargement of the EU.7 The EU’s relationship with Africa can 
be traced back to the Treaty of Rome. Although the Cotonou Agreement has been described 
by many as something of a watershed, we shouldn’t forget that to a degree we have simply 
come full circle. As van Reisen usefully reminds us the Treaty of Rome’s provision for an 
association between Europe and the original member states’ colonies created what in essence 
was a free trade area between the two.8 So when considering the negotiation of EPAs with 
the ACP group of states we should appreciate that in effect what we are actually witnessing is 
a normalisation of relations. The limited concessions made to ACP states in the first Lomé 
Convention of 1975 have been progressively removed ever since. This view stands in contrast 
to attempts made by the EU to dismiss the significance of the legacies of colonialism. The 
Green Paper of 1996 that set the path for the Cotonou Agreement claimed that the EU’s 
relationship with ACP states had already moved beyond both the colonial and post-colonial 
phase.9 
 
The history of EU development co-operation is also directly related to the process of 
enlargement. The first enlargement in 1973 which saw the UK, Ireland and Denmark join the 
EU, was significant in expanding the focus of European policy beyond the associated 
countries. A number of former British colonies, particularly those in Asia (e.g. India), were 
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seen as too developed to join what became the Lomé Convention and therefore it was clear 
that additional development co-operation instruments would be necessary. In 1976 a 
European budget line for aid to countries from Asia and Latin America was created.10 The 
accession of Greece, Portugal and in particular Spain, to the EU during the 1980s increased 
the focus towards Latin America. Freres notes that during the last decade relations between 
the two regions have stagnated and he suggests that the most recent EU enlargements from 15 
to 27 member states, together with a number of leftist governments coming to power in Latin 
America, are the main reasons for this.11 
 
More recent enlargements of the EU do present an opportunity to shift development policy 
away from just being a continuation of Europe’s colonial past. However, the problem is that 
the new member states appear less interested in development policy.12 There are also the 
negative economic impacts that European enlargement can have on developing countries. For 
example, the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s meant that many of the 
key agricultural exports of North Africa were now being produced within Europe itself.13 
 
Global Context 
 
EU development policy exists within a broader framework of international development 
initiatives. Whilst I outline below how self-interest is part of the explanation for 
understanding the direction of EU development policy, there is also an ideological 
component. The EU has consciously aligned the objectives of its development policy with the 
wider consensus that has formed around the UN’s Millennium Development Goals.14  The 
emphasis on reciprocity in EU trade relations is underpinned by the international consensus 
on the benefits of free trade for development, whilst the focus on promoting regional 
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integration between developing countries is based on a distinctly European view of the 
benefits of economic integration.15 
 
One of the most significant global contexts in recent years has been the continued failure to 
reach agreement in the Doha Development Round of the WTO. This impasse in multilateral 
negotiations has increased the importance of the trade dimension of the EU’s relations with 
developing countries.16 In its bilateral trade negotiations towards both Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements (EMAs) and EPAs with the ACP states, it appears that the EU is trying to 
advance the inclusion of services and the ‘Singapore issues’ that were rejected during WTO 
negotiations. The EU has been an enthusiastic advocate of the inclusion of investment, 
competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation (the so-called ‘Singapore 
issues’) within the WTO. However, developing countries have consistently argued against 
their inclusion in the multilateral trade system, most notably during the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún, Mexico in 2003. 
 
A number of the authors in the books under review are critical of these attempts by the EU to 
include them in bilateral agreements. In discussing EMAs, Mold concludes that there is a 
danger that they will become ‘bereft of all social and developmental content’.17 Similarly 
their inclusion is one of the most controversial aspects of the EPAs being negotiated with 
ACP states. Although they have not been included in the interim EPAs that have been signed 
with Africa and the Pacific, the only full EPA that has been agreed so far with the Caribbean 
group of ACP countries (CARIFORUM) does include rules on investment, competition 
policy and government procurement.18 
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The global development agenda in the era after 9/11 has seen Western donors increasing links 
to security concerns, with a focus on ‘fragile’ states in particular. The EU is no different in 
this regard. The European Consensus on Development suggests there is a two-way 
relationship between security and development. It is stated that ‘there cannot be sustainable 
development without peace and security, and sustainable development is the best structural 
response to the deep-rooted causes of violent conflicts and the rise of terrorism’.19 Youngs 
claims that this attempt at coherence is liable to result in the different parts of the EU policy-
making machinery trying to obtain greater resources and influence. Certainly the fear that 
resources for development aid might be diverted towards what are arguably security matters, 
has some grounds given recent examples of development spending on immigration controls, 
technical assistance for anti-terrorism, and security patrols of the Mediterranean border.20 
However, in other areas, such as the negotiations towards EPAs, there has been no attempt to 
make links to their security implications. Olsen suggests that the main reason for this is the 
departmentalisation of EU policy-making that has resulted in DG Trade being solely 
responsible for these negotiations with ACP states.21 
 
Uniformity of Approach 
 
The EU’s development policy has in recent years become explicitly more uniform in 
approach. Relations with the Mediterranean region, ACP states, Latin America, and Asia are 
all built on three main pillars: development assistance (aimed at poverty alleviation and 
democracy promotion), bilateral trade agreements, and political dialogue. This approach fails 
to take sufficient account of the particular circumstances that exist in different parts of the 
world. Although the EU may have moved in recent years to a development policy closely 
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resembling the PWC this does not overcome the weaknesses of adopting a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, recently re-launched in 2008 as the ‘Union for the 
Mediterranean’, focuses on three main areas: political/security issues, economic and financial 
co-operation, and social, cultural and civil society matters. Like its relations with other 
regions, the EU has made limited progress in all areas except that of economic co-operation. 
Bilateral trade agreements have been agreed with all the Mediterranean partners, except 
Libya.22 The aim is to eventually create a Euro-Med FTA by 2010. To achieve this, the EU is 
also encouraging regional trade liberalisation amongst the Mediterranean countries. So far the 
Agadir FTA between Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt has been agreed and is open to the 
inclusion of new members. 
  
The EU’s relationship with the ACP states has historically been more explicitly 
developmental in focus. However, the Cotonou Agreement has to a significant extent 
normalised the approach adopted so that is in line with other regions. The negotiation of 
EPAs is driven by a desire for greater economic integration with the EU and the promotion of 
regional trade liberalisation within the various sub-regions. The EU has portrayed the need to 
conform to WTO rules as an ‘outside’ force in its justification of EPAs.23 This fails to 
acknowledge that WTO rules are a political construct and that the EU has a significant say in 
these rules.24 Aid continues to be provided through the European Development Fund and 
although conditionalities exist, they are not tied directly to the signing of FTAs as they are 
with aid to the near abroad.25 Political dialogue now takes place through the Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership. 
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In relations with Latin America, only limited progress has been made in the realm of trade 
agreements. Bilateral agreements with Mexico and Chile have been concluded and talks 
continue with Central America and the Andean Community. However, negotiations for a 
FTA with the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) have been suspended pending 
progress on the Doha Development Round in the WTO. Political dialogue includes biennial 
EU-Latin American and Caribbean summits, inter-parliamentary conferences and limited 
dialogue among civil society organisations. Freres argues that whilst in the past it may have 
been possible to argue that the EU offered an alternative to the hegemonic approach of the 
United States, it is questionable now whether the European approach to Latin America is any 
different.26 
 
EU relations with East Asia have been focused on the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Asia is arguably the region that has witnessed the least progress in the 
three-fold approach adopted by the EU elsewhere. Negotiations towards the creation of an 
EU-ASEAN FTA were launched in 2007 but appear a long way from any resolution. In 
recent years the vast majority of development aid to ASEAN has gone to Vietnam and 
Indonesia, but unlike areas of more strategic interest for the EU there is little evidence of the 
inclusion of democratic conditionality.27 Political dialogue is conducted via the Asia-Europe 
Meeting, which also includes China, Japan and South Korea. 
 
In emphasising the broadly similar policy measures adopted by the EU to the different 
regions in its development policy, we should not discount the variations in strategic 
importance observed by European policymakers. Since the end of the Cold War there has 
been a much greater emphasis on the ‘near abroad’ in EU development co-operation and the 
more recent inclusion of security and migration issues (discussed below) have only served to 
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accentuate this trend.28 This is demonstrated by the fact that pre-accession aid is the biggest 
single area of expenditure within external aid spending.29 The creation of the Neighbourhood 
Policy in 2004, although not an official arm of development co-operation, does include 
relations with the Mediterranean. It is this increasing self-interest, related to a desire to 
increase the significance of the EU as a global actor, which is also central to our 
understanding of contemporary development policy. 
 
EU Self-Interest? 
 
When we consider the external relations of the EU more broadly it is clear that a concern for 
the needs of developing countries is often of secondary importance. It has been suggested that 
a more mercantilist approach, in line with that of the United States, has been adopted.30 Van 
Reisen concludes that ‘EU development co-operation has...been continuously under the 
pressure of subordination to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and of being 
linked to other external priorities’.31 
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has had a deleterious impact upon many developing 
countries. It accounts for a greater share of the EU budget than any other single expenditure. 
EU subsidies have often led to over-production with the excess being ‘dumped’ on 
developing countries. It has become commonplace for the removal of the CAP to be seen as a 
panacea for the whole of the developing world. However, as Flint explains it is only certain 
developing countries (chiefly those that comprise the Cairns Group) that would benefit from 
the dismantling of the CAP.32 The CAP results in very high domestic prices and those 
developing countries that do get preferential access to the European market are able to benefit 
from these high prices.33 Moreover, CAP protection is not the only barrier to the export of 
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agricultural produce from developing countries. The ever more stringent sanitary and phyto-
sanitary and environmental standards imposed by the EU present an additional obstacle.34 
 
The EU has also been criticised for its plans to pressure developing countries to introduce 
measures to control migration. Historically the EU’s approach to migration has centred on 
limiting migration and creating a ‘fortress Europe’. Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement was 
one of the first attempts by the EU to incorporate migration into its development policy.  In 
2002 the European Council agreed that any ‘future EU association or cooperation agreement 
should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission 
in the event of illegal immigration’.35 In 2005 the EU outlined what it claimed was a more 
‘global approach’ to its migration policy.36 This document outlined the importance of 
remittances, the role of members of the various diaspora in development, and measures to 
limit the impact of the ‘brain drain’. Despite these recent attempts by the EU to adopt a more 
development-focused approach, Lavenex and Kunz conclude that an approach based on the 
control of immigration persists.37 
 
Crawford’s work on Ghana reveals the interaction between the strategic interests of the EU 
and the type of development assistance pursued. He argues that the reality of democracy 
promotion is far less impressive than the rhetorical claims made by the EU suggest. Ghana 
receives limited support for democracy promotion because European interests are marginal. 
Moreover, the form that democracy promotion takes is centred on decentralisation, public 
sector reform, and targeted support for certain civil society actors. This approach, according 
to Crawford, is more about limiting the power of the state rather than increasing popular 
participation. This is an approach that is theoretically consistent with neo-liberalism and the 
promotion of trade liberalisation in particular.38 Holden provides a similar view of European 
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policy to Ghana and argues that the proposed EPA may harm the economic development that 
will be necessary to consolidate the type of political reforms pursued by the EU.39 
 
Institutional changes within the European Commission have also played a role in the 
relegation of development to the foreign policy interests of the EU. During the same period 
that the EU has claimed to have a greater focus on poverty alleviation, organisational changes 
within the Commission appear to contradict this claim. The DG for External Relations (DG-
RELEX) is in charge of programming and policy to the Mediterranean, Latin American, and 
Asian regions. Trade negotiations with ACP states were moved from DG Development to DG 
Trade. Although on paper the Commissioner for Development has the portfolio for all 
developing countries, in practice DG Development has become an ‘empty shell’.40 Holden 
suggests there are evident tensions here with DG RELEX thinking that DG Development is 
not focused enough on the wider foreign policy goals of the EU.41 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, the books under review highlight the comprehensive nature of contemporary 
EU development policy. Drawing on the thoughts of many of the authors it is important to 
put current policy into historical and global context. The increasing uniformity of approach 
should be understood as part of an attempt to lock-in liberal capitalism to regional projects in 
different parts of the developing world. Holden understands this as the EU’s drive to increase 
its structural power in the global political economy.42 What his book fails to address is 
whether this is in the interests of the poor majority in the developing world or not. The failure 
to achieve much more than a rhetorical commitment to policy coherence for development 
highlights how European self-interest is becoming more apparent given the desire for a 
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CFSP. Here I would be less optimistic than Carbone who argues that ‘achieving better policy 
coherence for development is no longer a “mission impossible”’.43 
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